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Golub v. PPD Corp. I
OnJuly 9, 1976, PPD Corporation and Anta Corporation entered into
an agreement providing that PPD sell its assets to Anta, and that Anta
assume substantially all of the debts of PPD. It was further agreed that the
name of PPD would be changed to GCI, Inc. Meanwhile, Anta was to
form a new corporation 2 to receive the assets and continue the business
formerly conducted by PPD. The agreement was subject to the approval of
the shareholders of the selling corporation. 3 This group consisted of in-
vestors among the general public who owned eighteen percent and the in-
dividual defendants4 who owned the remaining shares. The individual
defendants either held positions on the Board of Directors, were officers,
or both.5 On August 27, 1976, notice was given that a shareholders'
meeting would be held on September 16th for the purpose of putting the
proposed agreement to a vote. The notice included a proxy statement that
set out in great detail the bonuses to be paid to any officers in the manage-
ment of PPD who decided to remain in the employ of the Anta-formed
successor. 6 The proxy statement noted that management was in favor of
the proposed sale; it added that because of the controlling ownership of
the officers and directors, approval was a foregone conclusion. The
meeting was held and the sale approved by 99.4% of the voting shares.
1. 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978), affg 435 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
2. The newly-formed corporation was also named PPD Corporation. For
ease of discussion, the corporation in which the plaintiffs were shareholders (the
predecessor, subsequently named GCI, Inc.) will be referred to as PPD Corpora-
tion.
3. A similar agreement was used in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa.
427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958). In that case, List Industries was to sell its assets to Glen
Alden in exchange for Glen Alden stock. The court, on the basis that List was the
larger company, looked to the substance of the transaction and ignored its form.
The court held that the sale was a disguised merger, and gave appraisal rights to
the plaintiff minority shareholders.
4. The individual defendants who were officers and owned stock were A.
Sam Gittlin, B. Morton Gittlin, and Robert Schwartz. Robert B. Winkel was a
defendant-officer, but owned no stock. 576 F.2d at 762.
5. A. Sam Gittlin was honorary Chairman of the Board, Chairman of the
Executive Committee, and Treasurer. B. Morton Gittlin was active Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer. Robert G. Schwartz was Secretary and
Executive Vice President. Robert B. Winkel was President. Id.
6. Additionally, the new corporation had to meet certain profitability
targets in order for the bonuses to be paid. Id.
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The plaintiffs, a group of minority shareholders, either dissented or ab-
stained in the voting.7
The plaintiffs brought this action on behalf of themselves and all other
minority shareholders of PPD in federal district court in Missouri. They
alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, specifically that the proxy statement failed to disclose
management's motivations for approval of the sale or to characterize the
bonus as a premium for stock ownership. The plaintiffs further asserted a
cause of action, pendent to the federal claim, under the statutory and
common law of New Jersey for breach of fiduciary duty, and sought
declaratory and equitable relief. The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint, supporting the motion with relevant documents. The district
court treated this motion as one for summary judgment8 and dismissed the
suit without prejudice. The plaintiffs' motion to file an amended com-
plaint was also dismissed on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
federal claim upon which relief could be granted, 9 even though the plain-
tiffs had changed their theory from section 14(e) to 14(a)10 and had alleged
scienter as required by section 10(b). 1 ' On appeal, the Eighth Circuit con-
sidered the district court's rulings on both motions in light of all three sec-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act as well as the rules promulgated under
those sections.12 Noting that the sections are aimed at the same general
7. On September 11, 1976, the plaintiffs had written a letter to the defen-
dants, and took the same position they took in their suit. At the shareholders'
meeting the Castens and A.M. Investment Corp. abstained while Golub voted
against the measure. Id. at 763.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. In this context, the standard to apply is that
reasonable minds could not differ as to the materiality of the misstatement or
omission. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc.,
415 F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir. 1969); Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031,
1034 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
9. The court dismissed the causes of action under state law because of the
lack of diversity. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), (e) (1976). Section 14(e) was enacted to regulate
abuses connected with tender offers.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), held that an actionable claim under § 10(b) required a showing of
scienter.
12. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976),
provides:
Section 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange- . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978), provides:
1979]
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evils and are therefore in pari materia (on the same subject matter), the
court determined that the statutes should be construed similarly. It af-
firmed the district court's rulings, relying on decisions under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5.13
The decision of the court of appeals in Golub is based upon an adop-
tion of the policy expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green. 14 Green was a rule 10b-5 case in which the
Court held that the federal securities laws were not intended to reach
wrongs that essentially comprised corporate mismanagement or breach of
fiduciary duty. The Court justified its decision by pointing out that these
problems traditionally have been resolved through litigation in state
courts, and that the words "manipulative and deceptive" in the federal
statute are terms of art, referring to specific prohibited practices. 15 The
Court in Green held that conduct which met all of the required elements of
rule lOb-5, but which was not one of these specific practices, should be
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Section 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), provides:
Section 14(a). It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails
or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any
facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors, to solicit or permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or con-
sent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.
Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1978), provides:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other com-
munication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time
and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false
or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier com-
munication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same
meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
13. 576 F.2d at 764-65.
14. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
15. The Supreme Court stated that the "term refers generally to practices,
such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead
investors." Id. at 476.
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litigated in the state courts. Construing the rules and statutory sections in
parimateria, the Golub court applied the rule 10b-5 principles of Green to
a section 14(a) action. It held that those actions literally within the scope of
section 14(a), but which essentially involve breaches of fiduciary duty or
corporate mismanagement, do not state a cause of action under the
federal statute. 16 The decision in Golub is noteworthy because it limits the
scope of section 14(a) through the adoption of the broad policy of Green
with little regard for the narrow rationale of that case.
Central to the logic of Golub is the applicability of the principle of in
pari materia. Under this principle of construction, statutes dealing with
the same subject matter should be similarly construed. 7 The court relied
heavily on in pari materia, interpreting section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 in
light of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Superficially at least, the statutes do
concern the same subject matter. Both sections were enacted in order to
bring abuses in the securities field under federal regulation. In accordance
with this objective, courts were quick to find implied private causes of ac-
tion under both sections to gain the enforcement aid of the investing
public as private attorneys general. As the court in Golub noted, the sec-
tions overlap in certain respects; 18 certain conduct may fall within the pur-
view of both sections 10(b) and 14(a). In a general sense, both sections are
aimed at disclosure of information relevant to securities transactions.
Closer analysis indicates that the Golub court may have applied in pari
materia too freely. A detailed comparison of sections 10(b) and 14(a)
reveals substantial dissimilarity in focus both in the elements required to
state a cause of action under each section and in the available remedies.
The most significant difference lies in the focus of the two sections and
their respective rules. Rule lOb-5 furthers market integrity through the
promotion of full disclosure; it prohibits trading on inside information,
and while not preventing all market inequities, the rule attempts to insure
that all traders have access to the same information. Rule 14a-9 is also
aimed at disclosure, but its focus is on abuses in corporate democracy.
More specifically, statements in solicitation of proxies are to be free from
16. 576 F.2d at 764. See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
925 (1978).
17. State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N.E. 469 (1896) (criminal statutes).
See also Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commis-
sioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). These cases considered the applicability of in
pari materia to the federal tax statutes. Merrill held that the estate and gift tax
statutes are in pari materia and should be similarly construed. But Farid-Es-
Sultaneh held that the gift and income tax statutes are not to be so construed.
The court pointed out the differing aims of the statutes as a basis for the inap-
plicability of in pari materia. This reasoning illustrates the inapplicability of the
principle to §§ 10(b) and 14(a).
18. 576 F.2d at 764.
1979] 813
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any material misstatements or omissions. This difference in focus or pur-
pose' 9 leads to more subtle differences between the two sections.
A comparison of the language of sections 14(a) and 10(b) illustrates
some of these differences. Both statutes include language conferring the
power to regulate securities transactions and to promulgate rules, 20 as well
as providing prohibitions against omissions or misleading statements. 2'
However, section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 lack the words "manipulative and
deceptive," 22 determined by the Green decision to be terms of art in the
context of section 10(b).
As for the elements required to state a cause of action under the two
sections, the early cases indicated a common ground, but subsequent cases
began to slowly diverge. Formerly under both sections a plaintiff had to
allege and show causation; more recent cases presume causation if all
other elements are shown. 23 In a section 14(a) action, though, a slight rem-
nant of causation not applicable to 1Ob-5 suits appears to survive: plaintiffs
must show that the solicitation of proxies was a substantial step in the ac-
complishment of the transaction. 24 Both sections also originally required
the same mental state. While negligence continues to be sufficient for a
cause of action under section 14(a),2 5 the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder26 determined that a higher level of culpability is required
under section 10(b). In fact, at present rule 14a-9 requires only either a
19. The central purpose of § 14(a) is full disclosure. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 426 (1964); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D. Iowa
1970); Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf. Klaus v.
Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) (injunction given against defensive
tactics during tender offer).
20. The language which confers power to regulate includes "by the use of
the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce." See note 12
supra.
21. Id.
22. In Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
the court refused to find that § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 require intent to defraud
because of the absence of the terms "manipulative or deceptive."
23. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969) (§ 10(b)); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Iowa
1970) (§ 14(a)); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (§
14(a)); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (§ 14(a)).
For a recent § 14(a) case requiring causation, see Smith v. Murchison, 310 F.
Supp. 1079, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
24. Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977); Popkin v.
Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Phillips v. Topin, 403 F. Supp. 89, (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 548 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1976); Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp.
1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
25. Puma v. Marriott, 363 F. Supp. 750 (D. Del. 1973), affd mem., 503
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1974). Negligence was recognized through the use of construc-
tive knowledge as sufficient in § 14(a) actions in Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F.
Supp. 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
814 [Vol. 44
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material misstatement or a material omission, 27 while rule lOb-5 requires
inside information, materiality, a purchase or sale of stock, and scienter.
28
This difference in the elements has been recognized by the courts; in one
case, a judgment rendered under section 14(a) was held not to have res
judicata effect on a second action under section 10(b). 29
Sections 10(b) and 14(a) may also be compared with respect to the
remedies30 appropriate once a violation has been found. A section 10(b)
violation would appear easily compensable by monetary damages, com-
puted by a difference in stock market prices. In fact, injunctive relief is
highly questionable under this section; it may be ruled out by the purchase
requirement.3 1 A few cases have held that under special circumstances,
such as a short-form merger, injunctive relief would be appropriate
because a purchase would otherwise inevitably occur. 32 In contrast, a sec-
tion 14(a) violation which resulted in approval of a merger would seem best
rectified by the equitable remedy of rescission, although as an alternative
remedy damages may be appropriate.
Despite these important differences between sections 10(b) and 14(a),
the court of appeals in Golub applied the principle of inparimateria to af-
firm the district court's entry of summary judgment against the plaintiffs.
It set out the policies underlying the construction of rule 10b-5 in Green:
shareholders damaged by mere corporate mismanagement should litigate
in the traditional forum of the state courts, and the federal interest is
satisfied when the material facts are fully and fairly disclosed. 3 Employing
27. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Leighton v.
AT&T, 397 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp.
1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See also Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir.
1967).
28. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
29. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs., 443 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
affd, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978).
30. The remedies available are compared in Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F.
Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (merger case, shareholders' meeting enjoined). See
also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Evans, the court noted that
the Pennsylvania statute giving appraisal rights, by its very existence, could give
rise to an inference that a court has no power to issue an injunction. However, the
court stated that an injunction would be appropriate to effectuate the broad pur-
poses of the federal statute.
31. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
32. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967). See also Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972) (injunc-
tion in merger case under rule lOb-5); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970) (plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has
standing if he can establish causal connection between violations and his injury).
33. 576 F.2d at 764.
1979] 815
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the same logic with respect to rule 14a-9, the court concluded that the
federal interest was over because there had been full disclosure.3 4
34. Id. at 765. The court of appeals in Golub concluded that the federal in-
terest was satisfied on the premise that there had been full disclosure. However,
the court did not fully analyze this issue, especially with regard to the materiality
of the alleged omission. The court simply held that plaintiffs were not entitled to
a characterization of the bonuses as a premium attributable to stock ownership,
without discussing the possibility of this "characterization" as a material "fact."
Courts have stated that materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, or the ap-
plication of a legal standard to a particular set of facts. TSC Indus., Inc., v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976); Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio
Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1976). However, there is support for the
holding in Golub that the defendant's true motivations need not be disclosed.
Joyce v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., 571 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905
(1978); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1084 (2d Cir. 1977) (§ 14(a) imposes no duty to reveal conflicts of interest); Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Rodman v. Grant Foundation, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,599 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Other courts have reached
similar results by holding that the purpose of both rule 14a-9 and rule lob-5 is full
disclosure, not a dispassionate presentation of conflicting interpretations of the
facts. Lavin v. Data Sys. Analysts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd
mem., 578 F.2d 1374 (1978); Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 524
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The standard for materiality is an "elusive concept" and it has been defined in
amorphous terms such as "fair accuracy." General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus.,
Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). See
also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
925 (1972). Materiality has been expressed often in terms of influence on the in-
vestor, even though causation need not be shown. The earlier standard was a
substantial likelihood that the facts might affect the judgment of a reasonable in-
vestor. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite, Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); General Time Corn. v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969); McDonough v. Champburger Corp., 488 F.2d 948, 953 (5th Cir. 1974);
Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970). The later stan-
dard is stronger: a substantial likelihood that it would affect the reasonable in-
vestor. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 50 (1977); Perelman v.
Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. 1298, 1300-01 (E.D. Pa.
1977). See also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Cole
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977) (actual significance in in-
vestor's mind); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326,
1330 (7th Cir. 1969); Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp.
339, 357-58 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,
375 F. Supp. 249, 269 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974)
(likelihood of reliance); Puma v. Marriott, 363 F. Supp. 750, 757 (D. Del. 1973),
affd mem., 503 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1974) ("not trivial"); Richland v. Crandall,
262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The Perelman, Cole and Swanson cases,
as well as Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), are
specifically concerned with materiality of omissions.
In Golub, summary judgment entered against the plaintiffs by the district
[Vol. 44816
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The extent of the federal interest in transactions which involve both
violations of securities laws and breaches of state fiduciary duties was
severely limited by the Supreme Court in Green, thus keeping with the
present Court's preference for state law. While this preferential policy is
applicable to many areas of the law, the means used in Green to reach a
conclusion consistent with this policy were quite specific. Although the
Supreme Court noted that there had been no misstatements or omissions, 35
this was not central to the holding nor to the reasoning behind it. The
Court instead interpreted the provisions of section 10(b) as terms of art
referring to specific practices such as wash sales and matched orders.3 6
Succinctly stated, the Court's dialectic was that the use of the terms
"manipulative and deceptive" shows a congressional intent to reach only
those specific practices bearing on market integrity, and therefore any
other transactions should be governed by state law. The extent of the
federal interest is limited to transactions involving the specific practices.3 7
Although section 14(a) lacks the terms of art present in section 10(b),
there is authority for the extension of the holding of Green to section 14(a).
It has been observed that no case has "held that the proxy rules are violated
because management has allegedly mismanaged the company, and the
proxy statement does not say so."38 Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real Estate
Investments Trust39 explicitly held that the decision rendered in Green was
court was affirmed. The applicable standara in this context is that reasonable
minds could not differ as to the materiality of the omission. Both courts must have
so concluded. See note 8 supra. An analogy can be made to a rule 10b-5 case in
which there was no purchase or sale of securities. In re Penn. Cent. Sec. Litiga-
tion, 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974). However, it has been held self-evident
that the fact of working control ownership is material. Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The granting
of summary judgment on the issue of materiality has been expressly rejected on
the grounds that this issue is a mixed question of law and fact. Imperial Supply
Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See TSC Indus.,
Inc., v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); note 41 infra.
35. 420 U.S. 462. The Supreme Court pointed out that the "information
statement" distributed in connection with the short-form merger disclosed the
price, and minority shareholders could either accept that price or seek an ap-
praisal. The choice was presented with all relevant information.
36. See note 15 supra.
37. The federal courts have frequently accepted the contention that the
federal interest is satisfied once there has been full disclosure of all relevant infor-
mation. Crane'Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc.,
415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Leighton v. AT&T, 397 F. Supp. 133(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
38. Markewich v. Adikes, 422 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). See
Levy v. Johnson, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,899 (S.D.N. Y. 1977); Walner v.
Friedman, 410 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
39. 432F. Supp. 1298(E.D. Pa. 1977). See Barnettv. Anaconda Co., 238F.
1979]
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applicable to section 14(a).cases. The rationale turned on the principle ex-
pressed in Cort v. Ash: unless fiduciary responsibilities are established by
federal statute, the appropriate remedy for any breach lies in state law. 40
However, like Golub, Perelman adopted the general policy of the Green
case without consideration of its rationale. More importantly, the policy of
Green was used in Perelman only to deny summary judgment for the plain-
tiff in a case where materiality of the alleged omission was doubtful at
best. 4'
Authority also may be found for applying Green to section 14(a) by an
extension of cases which examine the overlap between sections 10(b) and
14(a). As the court in Golub noted, the "manipulative, or deceptive device
[used]... in violation of Rule 10b-5 may be a deceptive, inaccurate, or in-
sufficient proxy statement prohibited by Rule 14a-9. ' '42 Some courts have
spoken of deficient proxy statements entirely in terms of rule 10b-5;43 the
policy of Green thus might be adapted to section 14(a) on the basis that the
situations covered by the two sections are quite similar, even though the
elements required to state a cause of action are not. These recent cases in-
dicate a judicial climate favorable to the application of in pari materia to
sections 10(b) and 14(a).
The goal of any method of statutory construction, including the use of
in pari materia, is to ascertain the intent of the enacting body with respect
to the problem presented to the court. Green held that the congressional
Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Barnett, the court used reasoning similar to that
in Green to dismiss a claim under § 14(a). The court stated that while "Congress
... intended to protect a broad spectrum of investors' rights .... it did not pre-
empt the whole field of corporate affairs and transform the federal courts into a
general forum to oversee them." Id. at 770.
40. 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
41. The plaintiff alleged that if certain relationships-including surety
agreements-had been known, that particular trustee would not have been
elected. The Perelman case is also notable for its discussion of the materiality of
omissions; it stated that "there is no contention by plaintiff that the inclusion of
those facts would be necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading." 432 F. Supp. at 1304. This standard of materiality is almost identical
to rule 14a-9. See note 12 supra. See also Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
435 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1970); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d
159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Gould v. American-
Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Ash v. Brunswick Corp.,
405 F. Supp. 234 (D. Del. 1975); CMC Corp. v. Kern County Land Co., 290 F.
Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1968). The Perelman court also held that Green and
Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), are ap-
plicable to § 14(a).
42. 576 F.2d at 764. For other cases which examine this overlap, see Dasho
v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972);
Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Balwin-Montrose Chem. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
43. McDonough v. Champburger Corp., 488 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1974);
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intent reflected by the language of section 10(b) is to cover certain specific
practices and leave others to be litigated in the state courts. A congres-
sional intent to cover a wider, unspecified range of problems inherent in
proxy statements is indicated by the differing languge of section 14(a).
Courts have held that this difference in language required the use of dif-
ferent jury instructions,44 and that a judgment under one section has no res
judicata effect on the other. 45 Another example of statutory construction
along these lines concerned the Williams Act, or section 14(e) .46 This sec-
tion adopted the language of section 10(b) almost verbatim, and the sec-
tion was held to have required the same elements as section 10(b) because
the enactment "accepted the precedential baggage these words have car-
ried over the years.147 The language of section 14(a) is quite different, and
it is not necessarily appropriate to infer that Congress had a similar intent
in its enactment, especially to infer a desired relegation to state law of the
policing of proxy statements. 48
While conflicts involving corporate mismanagement have been
litigated in the state courts, the area of proxy statements has been tradi-
tionally relegated to federal remedies. Federal regulation of proxy
statements reflects the strong federal interest, acknowledged consistently
by the courts, 49 in disclosure. Even Green explicitly recognized this in-
terest.50 Cases decided since Green have held that if the allegations which
give rise to the claim for corporate mismanagement state a federal
securities claim under section 14(a), the federal courts may resolve breach
of fiduciary duty cases. 51
The Golub court added as a basis for dismissal of the plaintiffs' action
that the proxy statement was fully adequate under section 14(a) and rule
44. Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
45. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs., 443 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
affd, 582 F.2d 259 (1978).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
47. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
945 (2d Cir. 1969), cited with approval in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
48. Although somewhat dated, the broad holding inJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), appears quite viable. Borak held that the proxy rules im-
pliedly create a private cause of action, and that the federal courts may award
whatever remedy will effectuate the broad purposes of the statute. These
holdings, along with the well-recognized federal interest in full disclosure,
present strong arguments for federal policing of proxy statements.
49. See note 37 supra.
50. 430 U.S. at 463.
51. Although the Supreme Court in Green instructed that breach of
fiduciary duty and corporate mismanagmeent cases be litigated in the state
courts, the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court will permit it to resolve some
of these conflicts. See note 9 supra. See also Biesenbach v. Guenther, 446 F. Supp.
98 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978); Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v.
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14a-9. 52 This determination necessarily involved a consideration of
materiality.5 3 However, if the discussion above 54 is correct, a logical exten-
sion of Green would make the materiality consideration a superfluous
argument. Green stands for a policy of preference-had there been no
claim at all stated within the purview of rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court
would not have had to strictly construe the language of section 10(b).
Green requires that a federal claim under section 10(b) which consists of
an allegation of corporate mismanagement be dismissed. The non-
material argument therefore is unnecessary. Even if there was an arguably
material omission, an extension of Green to section 14(a) would still man-
date a dismissal from federal court where the omission was one of cor-
porate mismanagement.
The decision in Golub is consistent with the present Supreme Court's
disinclination to permit federal litigation of conflicts traditionally re-
solved by the states. The case severely limits the scope of section 14(a). The
Eighth Circuit's use of the notion of preference for state litigation as ex-
pressed in Green means that section 14(a) will be available only in the more
obvious cases of material misstatements or omissions. This does little to
further the congressional intent that statements for solicitation of proxies
fully and fairly disclose all material facts. Green limits rule I Ob-5 actions to
those which truly affect market integrity. But while a transaction which
literally falls within the ambit of rule 10b-5 may not affect the market in-
tegrity, almost any conceivable section 14(a) violation would impact
adversely on the integrity of corporate democracy. This is apparent even if
the proxies were not necessary to accomplish the transaction, but were
solicited as a matter of grace.
Another important aspect of the Golub decision is that the court's un-
questioning adoption of the policy of preference for a state cause of action
side-stepped some very difficult issues. Had a federal claim been recog-
nized, the issue of whether an action will or should lie when the defective
proxy statement is used but the proxies solicited are not necessary to obtain
the number of votes required would have to be addressed. 55 The court
avoided the need to decide a problem it recognized in the opinion: whether
the bonus could be characterized as a premium for the ownership of a con-
trol block of stock.56 Further, the opinion permitted the court to ignore for
52. 576 F.2d at 765.
53. See note 34 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
55. See cases cited note 24 supra. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 717 (2d
Cir. 1972), specifically noted that the ability to push through a merger cannot by
itself defeat a claim for federal injunctive relief. Even if solicited only as a matter
of grace, equity would seem empowered to recognize a defective proxy and
possibly grant rescission. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 456, 463-64
(1969). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
56. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). This case shows the
state law remedy sought by the disappointed plaintiffs of Birnbaum v. Newport
820 [Vol. 44
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the most part some of the tougher questions of materiality of
misstatements or omissions.
The plaintiffs in Golub were placed in an unenviable position by the
decision. It was of little consolation that the court noted the "plaintiffs are
free to pursue that claim in an appropriate forum. '57 The claim referred to
is concededly only a "possible ... claim ... under applicable state law."58
Under the facts as given in this case, though, it may be especially difficult
to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duties. A claim against defendants
in their capacity as officers is easily countered by a reasonable business
purpose;5 9 a claim against them as majority shareholders is recognized in
only a few states as yet. 60 It is likely that many minority shareholders will
find themselves in a similar position if Golub is followed: they will have no
remedy. Golub clearly illustrates the problems inherent in the adoption of
the policy of Green, leaving an example of an action which affects the in-
tegrity of corporate democracy but is actionable in neither federal nor
state court.
CRAIG TOWERMAN
Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). After their
federal claim was rejected in Birnbaum, plaintiffs pursued and recovered on a
state law claim in Perlman for breach of fiduciary duties. The recovery was based
upon a characterization of the excess selling price as a premium for ownership of
a control block of stock.
57. 576 F.2d at 765.
58. Id.
59. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Gottfried
v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1947); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1941);
New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (Ct.
App. 1926).
60. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Debaun v. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d
686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975) (liability found for majority shareholder who
negligently sold to corporate pirate); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d
93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (liability where majority shareholder
chose merger over stock split to the exclusion of minority shareholders). 12
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